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          <dc:title>Robert Brandom and Political Theory</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
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          <dc:title>Countering the Pathologies of Recognition</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
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          <dc:creator>Casuso, Gianfranco</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Inferentialism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Epistemic Recognition</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Immediacy</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Hegel</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Diremption</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">This paper explores the ambivalence of recognition within contemporary critical theory, moving beyond Althusser’s conception of recognition as a purely ideological mechanism. Building on Honneth’s analysis, it argues that recognition both reinforces social reproduction and enables self-realization, often in ways that are difficult to disentangle. The first section of the paper examines the claim that recognition, like any social practice, is structured by a system of norms that govern the reciprocal attribution of practical and moral attitudes, along with the commitments they entail. In the second section, I argue that inferential practices offer a powerful methodological framework for analyzing recognition claims, as they reveal tacit forms of knowledge and challenge the presumed immediacy of prevailing social categories. The third section explores the role of social struggles in articulating and advancing recognition demands, emphasizing the value of an inferentialist-expressivist perspective rooted in Robert Brandom’s philosophy. I contend that inferentialism’s foundations in Hegelian logic, phenomenology, and pragmatism provide critical resources for understanding the epistemic break with immediacy that underlies emancipatory forms of recognition, as well as for clarifying the logical structures of critique and normative transformation.</dc:description>
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          <dc:title>Norms and Novelty in the Space of Reasons</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
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          <dc:creator>Dieleman, Susan</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Space of Reasons</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Exclusion</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Women</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Epistemic Injustice</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">Robert B. Brandom builds a vast philosophical system that begins from and depends on the claim that we are concept- or vocabulary-mongering creatures. Philosophy, he claims, is the discipline concerned with reflection on who we are, where who we are is defined discursively, and thus is concerned with reasoning about reasoning. In this article, I interrogate how Brandom’s understanding of “we” ought to be understood in light of the historical exclusion of women from the sorts of rational practices and abilities that are thought to be integral to it. My argument thus corroborates and builds upon recent work suggesting that the problems of epistemic injustice are relevant to, but largely ignored in, Brandom’s project. In short, I contend that Brandom’s theory of discursive normativity, where norms and novelty depend on a particular understanding of the space of reasons, does not provide the necessary theoretical tools to understand the historical exclusion of women from that space, or to explain how they have gained or might gain access to it.</dc:description>
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          <dc:title>Who Gets to Play?</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
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          <dc:creator>Dutilh Novaes, Catarina</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Inferentialism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Argumentation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Epistemic Exchange</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Power Relations</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Black Pete</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">Brandom’s inferentialism relies on a highly idealized account of discursive practices of giving and asking for reasons, which deviates considerably from concrete, real-life practices. In particular, it abstracts away features pertaining to politics and to the power relations among those involved in these practices. In this paper, I contrast Brandom’s account of the “game of giving and asking for reasons” with the conceptualization of argumentation as epistemic exchange (of reasons) that I have been developing in recent years. My account openly aims to be more realistic, taking into consideration in particular the cognitive limitations of human beings and the power relations underpinning discursive interactions. To illustrate the differences between the two approaches, I discuss a specific case study, namely the societal debates on the folk figure of “Black Pete” in the Netherlands. The case study illustrates in particular the limitations of Brandom’s account when it comes to problematizing the potentially exclusionary, status quo-affirming aspects of discursive practices of giving and asking for reasons.</dc:description>
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          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
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          <dc:date xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2025-12-17T01:00:00Z</dc:date>
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          <dc:title>Social Trust versus Liberal Irony</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
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          <dc:creator>Mouraud, Pierre-François</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Autonomy</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Robert Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Normativity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Alienation</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Modernity</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">This paper explores Robert Brandom’s contribution to the issues of emancipation and autonomy in modernity by focusing on the transition he advocates from “irony to trust.” To fully appreciate Brandom’s notion of trust, it must be contrasted with Rorty’s notion of irony. I argue that Brandom’s thick notion of social normativity articulated by recognition yields a richer, more robust model of autonomy than Rorty does. Grounding the discussion in the Enlightenment and tracing the Rousseau-Kant lineage, the analysis develops Brandom’s turn to trust as a way to overcome alienation characterizing modern self-governance. The main point is that normative statuses are not created by acts of self-legislation. Instead, normative statuses are socially instituted and binding only when complemented by reciprocal recognition across distinct social roles. From this, I distinguish between Rorty’s focus on ironic self-legislation and the private/public distinction and Brandom’s call for a transformation of agency to overcome alienation. The analysis concludes by discussing how Brandom’s model fosters a new form of intentional agency, bridging the private/public gap without collapsing plural vocabularies into a monolithic public normative order.</dc:description>
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          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
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          <dc:title>Robert Brandom and Political Theory</dc:title>
          <dc:description> 1. IntroductionRobert Brandom’s version of inferentialism is one of the most sophisticated, far-reaching, and prolific systems in analytic philosophy over the past half-century. His work is widely discussed both within and outside philosophy and has influenced disciplines such as political theory and the social sciences (Derry 2013; Saharrea &amp; Viale 2021). Philosophers like Lynne Tirrell (2012) and Tracy Llanera (2022) have applied his inferentialism to questions of deep social and political...</dc:description>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
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          <dc:creator>Huetter-Almerigi, Yvonne</dc:creator>
          <dc:creator>Santelli, Mauro</dc:creator>
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          <dc:title>The Right to Irony</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
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          <dc:creator>Penelas, Federico</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Richard Rorty</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Ironism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Epistemic Reparations</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">Some years ago, Robert Brandom transformed the question “Who are we?” that had guided MIE into an exploration of the problem of what form of good life political institutions ought to promote. So, the new political question is: What is the best form of life to develop, given the kind of we that we are? In this article, I follow the thread of that aspect of Brandom’s work to highlight affinities and divergences with Rorty’s ironist-liberal project. This will result, on the one hand, in identifying certain blind spots in Brandom’s approach to the phenomenon of language and, on the other, in defending what I will call the “right to irony,” which will be presented as a condition for exercising the “right to be known” recently developed by Jennifer Lackey.</dc:description>
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          <dc:title>Who or What Governs the “Game of Giving and Asking for Reasons”?</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
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          <dc:creator>Huetter-Almerigi, Yvonne</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Normativity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Commensuration</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Incommensurability</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Transcendentality</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Political Theory</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Existential Relevance</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">The article examines how the choice of what one takes to be the principle governing language influences theory-making down the road, in particular theories of personhood and emancipatory politics. I contrast Brandom’s rationalist account with Rorty’s meta-normative account and draw on Spivak’s analysis of why the subaltern “cannot speak” to highlight morally and politically relevant blind spots in Brandom’s theory. The line I follow is connected to what I frame as the necessity of normative commensuration in Brandom, contrasted with the possibility of normative rupture in Rorty. By this I mean that Brandom’s conception of semantic normativity lacks the resources to bridge normative gaps and therefore falls short of a key desideratum of many political and moral-ethical theories, namely, the capacity to extend recognition to voices that are not only excluded from the dominant discourse but are not even acknowledged as voices as such, even within potential counter-hegemonic games. In Brandom, personhood comes downstream from being rational, which renders the interpretation of expressions that are not continuous with his rationalist picture of language exceedingly difficult. By contrast, Rorty begins with the presumption of personhood and subsequently seeks to interpret a person’s utterances as serving rational ends, where “rational” is construed more broadly than in the perspectival-cognitive mode Brandom employs. I argue that this personhood-first orientation is essential for accommodating people’s sense that their own point of view matters, and that this requirement follows directly from how one understands language itself.</dc:description>
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          <dc:identifier>urn:doi:10.4000/15d8p</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
          <dc:identifier>https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/5519</dc:identifier>
          <dc:date xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2025-12-17T01:00:00Z</dc:date>
          <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
          <dc:type>article</dc:type>
          <dc:type>info:eu-repo/semantics/article</dc:type>
          <dc:identifier>urn:handle:20.500.13089/15d8p</dc:identifier>
          <dc:rights>https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/</dc:rights>
          <dc:title>Antagonism in the Space of Reasons</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
          <dc:source>URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap</dc:source>
          <dc:creator>Tossings, Raphaël</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Inferentialism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Hegemony</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Antagonism</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Laclau and Mouffe</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">This article develops a distinctive notion of political commitments that extends Robert Brandom’s inferentialism by drawing on Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe’s theory of hegemony and antagonism. I argue that Brandom and Laclau &amp; Mouffe’s accounts converge in presenting discursivity as a space of provisional norms without ultimate guarantees. Moreover, both accounts reveal how epistemic authority is asymmetrically distributed. However, I contend that Brandom’s dichotomy between doxastic and practical commitments fails to capture the specific antagonism of political commitments. I also suggest that counter-hegemonic Leftist politics cannot consist in engaging in rational debates. Rather, it requires discursive rearticulation: reframing hegemonic commitments as oppressive and binding together diverse struggles. By politicizing Brandomian inferentialism in this way, I show that the game of giving and asking for reasons is itself structured by antagonism and a struggle for hegemony.</dc:description>
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          <dc:identifier>https://doi.org/10.4000/15d8q</dc:identifier>
          <dc:identifier>urn:doi:10.4000/15d8q</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
          <dc:identifier>https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap/5553</dc:identifier>
          <dc:date xsi:type="dcterms:W3CDTF">2025-12-17T01:00:00Z</dc:date>
          <dc:rights>info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess</dc:rights>
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          <dc:title>Brandom’s Marx and the Compulsion of the Revolutionary Spirit</dc:title>
          <dc:publisher>European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy</dc:publisher>
          <dc:publisher>Associazione Pragma</dc:publisher>
          <dc:relation>info:eu-repo/semantics/reference/issn/2036-4091</dc:relation>
          <dc:source>URI:https://journals.openedition.org/ejpap</dc:source>
          <dc:creator>Raya, Iyad</dc:creator>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Robert Brandom</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Modernity</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Karl Marx</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Genealogy</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject xml:lang="en">Ideology</dc:subject>
          <dc:description xml:lang="en">Robert Brandom is an heir of the Enlightenment. Though politics is a topic Brandom is quietist about, a political orientation is discernible. Broadly, on the spectrum of political inclination, Brandom is a progressive. He hails modernity, “the only thing that has ever really happened to Geist” (Brandom 2019: 496), and yet diagnoses pathologies distinct of modernity, whose treatment lie not in a return to tradition but in leaping forward to a postmodern age of trust, where tradition and modernity are brought into synthesis, safeguarding both norm and freedom, societal cohesion and individual self-expression. Brandom’s diagnosis is insightful, and his projection to the future admirable, but there are doubts that the former doesn’t go deep enough, casting doubt, in turn, on the purchase of the latter. I will raise these doubts by examining the limits of Brandom’s reading of Marx and by outlining how an alternative interpretation – one that remains in proximity to the Brandomian conceptual space – poses challenges to the Brandomian project itself.</dc:description>
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